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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
TORT - RELEASE OF PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY -
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT - LIBERALIZATION
OF OHIO LAW
Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149,
203 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
The Ohio Supreme Court recently recognized mutual mistake
as a ground for relief in avoidance of personal injury releases, and
thereby has adopted a much more liberal approach to this previously
strict area of Ohio law. In Sloan v. Standard Oil Co.,' plaintiff
suffered a neck injury as a result of a rear-end collision between his
auto and defendant's truck. Plaintiff experienced soreness in his
neck and shoulders, but neither he nor defendant's office manager
was aware of any serious injury. Thus, plaintiff was paid $20.19
for property damage to his auto, and upon receipt of a check for
this amount he signed a comprehensive release. Approximately
six months after the accident, plaintiff felt a tingling sensation in
his hand. His condition grew progressively worse, and twelve
months after the accident plaintiff was operated on for a ruptured
cervical disc. Thereupon, an action was brought to have the release
canceled and to recover damages for personal injuries suffered dur-
ing the collision. Judgment in the amount of $8,500 was rendered
for the plaintiff in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, and
the court of appeals affirmed. The defendant thereupon filed a
motion to certify the record on the issue of whether the decision
of the two lower courts setting aside the release was contrary to
law. The Ohio Supreme Court held:
A release may be avoided where the releasor can establish by
clear and convincing evidence that it was executed by mutual mis-
take as between himself and the releasee, of a past or present fact
material to the release, as where there was a mutual mistake as to
the existence of any injury of the releasor, unless it appears further
that the parties intended that claims for all injuries, whether
known or unknown at the time of the execution of the release,
be relinquished.2
This decision expressly overrules O'Donnel v. Langdon,3 which held
that a release may not be avoided in the absence of fraud, misrepre-
sentation, duress, superior knowledge of the releasee, or inability
1. 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
2. Id. at 149, 203 N.E.2d at 239-40.
3. 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960).
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of the releasor to understand the release, notwithstanding the allega-
tion that the release was intended to cover property damage alone.
Since mutual mistake was not a basis for avoiding personal
injury releases in Ohio prior to Sloan, and since the decision in
Sloan therefore rested upon leading cases in other jurisdictions, an
analysis of the law in these other jurisdictions would be beneficial
in determining the guidelines for future litigation in Ohio in this
area.' The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the liberal view
that enforcement of a personal injury release may be avoided where
a mutual mistake of fact exists as to unknown injury5 or as to the
nature and extent of injury6 at the time the release was executed.
On the other hand, relief is usually denied where the mistake is
merely unilateral,7 but may be granted in cases of "true" unilateral
mistake where one party has knowledge of the other party's error.'
Also, in order to obtain relief for mutual mistake, most courts hold
that the mistake must relate to past or present facts rather than
to future matters amounting to opinion or prophecy.9
The essence of the majority rule is that the wording of the re-
lease is not conclusive; rather, it is the intention of the parties that
is controlling."0 What the parties intended in signing the release. is
a question of fact" and must be shown by clear and convincing
4. There is also a great deal of Ohio contract law relating to mistake which might
apply to certain cases. See generally, 37 OHIo JuR. 2d Mistake, Accident, or Surprise
§§ 4-9 (1959). However, personal injury cases are said to be "sui generis" and one
should be cautioned against relying on the principles of commercial contracts. See
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1946); Clancy v. Pacenti,
15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 176, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1957).
5. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962); Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97,
28 Cal. Rptr 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963); Hall v. Strom Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253,
118 N.W.2d 281 (1962); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich, 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (-1957).
6. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 111. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957); see Annor., 71
A.LR.2d 82, 90.94 (1960); 3 CORBrN, CoNTRACrS § 598 (2d ed. 1960).
7. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959).
8. Note, Unilateral Mistake of Fact in Personal Injury Releases, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 70, 72 (1961). This article also brings out that "true" unilateral mistake borders
on fraud.
9. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 288, 155 NXE.2a 827 (1959). A "mistake
in prognosis rather than diagnosis is insufficient." 3 FRTIMER & BENorr, PERSONAL
INjURY S 4.01[d] (1957); Note, Avoidance of Personal Injury Release for Mutual
Mistake of Fact, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 98, 99 (1958).
10. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 112, 28 Cal. Rptr 307, 316, 378 P.2d 579, 588
(1963). In Larson v. Stowe, 228 Minn. 216, 36 N.W.2d 601 (1959), the court made
the following statement: "The existence of injuries of such a character that reasonable
parties could not have entered into the agreement except through error is an element
that weights heavily against the finality of all-inclusive language." Id. at 219, 36
N.W.2d at 603.
11. Dausby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1, 5 (1962); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
5 1551 (2d ed. 1937).
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proof. 2 But regardless of the intent of the injured party, he must
exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the true nature of his
injury. 3 In addition, an action to rescind a release is equitable in
nature, and each case rests upon its own facts. 4 As an indication
of the intent of the parties, the following factors are considered in
favor of the injured party: (1) the lack of consideration paid for
personal injuries; (2) the absence of negotiation leading to settle-
ment; (3) the absence of any discussion about the risk of existing
but unknown injuries; (4) the reasonableness of plaintiff's belief
that he had not suffered any injury; (5) the conclusiveness of de-
fendant's liability;'" (6) the haste of defendant in securing the
release;' and (7) the presence of terms in the release excluding
the alleged injuries.'7
In Sloan, the court took cognizance of the above factors, but felt
that the presence of only four of the factors was sufficient to give
an indication of the parties' intent.'8 First, the court found that
there was no negotiation prior to settlement; the parties had no
difficulty in agreeing as to the amount of damages. Second, there
was no discussion of personal injuries. The plaintiff had suffered
only slight pain at the time of the collision, and was told the day
after the accident to forward the bill for property damage. The
personal injury appearing to be negligible, he made no demand to
recover for it. Third, the consideration paid was the exact amount
due for the property damage. Thus, the fact that there had been no
personal injury claim was further substantiated. Fourth, neither
party was aware of the nature or extent of injury, which was a
crucial factor in plaintiff's case. Although both parties were aware
of the stiff neck condition, neither was aware of a serious, hidden
neck injury existing at the time the release was signed. The reason
this factor is so crucial is that some courts limit recovery to injuries
which are hidden at the time of executing the release but which
eventually come to light, whereas recovery is often denied for ad-
verse consequences ultimately developing from a known yet appar-
12. Stumpf v. Stumpf, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (Ct. App. 1938).
13. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957); Frazer v. Glass,
311 Ill. App. 336, 342, 35 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1941); see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82,
148-151 (1960).
14. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 340, 86 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1957).
15. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 28 Cal. Rptr 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963).
16. Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82, 169-70 (1960).
17. Id. at 156.
18. Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 154, 203 N.E.2d 237, 241 (1964).
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ently negligible injury. 9 In Sloan, the court was of the opinion
that plaintiff's injuries were of the "hidden" variety, not "adverse
consequences," and hence the latter rule precluding recovery was not
applied.
There are many situations, however, where application of the
above rule is difficult in that the distinction between "hidden" in-
juries and "adverse consequences" is negligible and merely arbitrary.
The issue is oftentimes purely semantic requiring meticulous medi-
cal testimony to arrive at the desired conclusion. This frequently
results in even more confusion, in which case a court might merely
look at the overriding circumstances in a given case and totally
disregard the rule which often precludes recovery. But regardless
of the circumstances in a particular case, the decisions cited in Sloan
voice the policy arguments which one may fall back upon. On
the one hand, it is the policy of the law to encourage out-of-court
settlements. In furtherance of this policy, the courts should hold
the parties to the express terms of their agreement, for otherwise
no release would be final until the statute of limitations has run. 0
On the other hand, there is the view that in such cases the frailties
of the human mind and body are at stake and hence the conse-
quences are much more serious and unpredictable than those occur-
ring in ordinary commercial transactions.21  It follows therefore
that the injured party should not be abandoned to his own resources
while an insurer has, for a trifling sum, avoided fulfilling an
obligation which it has been paid to assume.2
Prior to the instant case, it was dearly established in Ohio that
relief in avoiding a release for personal injuries was limited to
situations involving duress and misrepresentation. The Sloan case,
19. In Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962), plaintiff recovered where she
thought she had merely suffered a bruised knee at the time of eiecuting the release, but
had in fact suffered torn ligaments and a severe knee fracture. In Clancy v. Pacenti,
15 IIl. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957), plaintiff recovered, thinking she had
merely suffered a sprained back muscle, but was later operated on for. a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc. In Hall v. Strom Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 118 N.W.2d 281 (1962),
plaintiff suffered head and back injuries which were not expected to be permanent.
Recovery was allowed since the parties were unaware of plaintiff's concussion lwhich
later developed into a form of epilepsy.
Professor Corbin is of the view that recovery is more likely where the subsequently
discovered injury is of a difference in kind, i.e., where one signs a release thinking he
has merely bruised his back, but has in fact broken his back. 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACrs
§ 1292 (2d ed. 1962); see also 45 AM. JUR. Release § 20 (1943); 3 FRUMER & BEN-
OiT, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4.01 [d).
20. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 28 Cal. Reptr 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963).
21. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
22. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
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